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In the study of the evolution of cooperation, resource limitations are usually assumed just to
provide a finite population size. Recently, however, it has been pointed out that resource limitation
may also generate dynamical payoffs able to modify the original structure of the games. Here we
study analytically a phase transition from a homogeneous population of defectors when resources
are abundant, to the survival of unconditional cooperators when resources reduce below a threshold.
To this end, we introduce a model of simple agents, with no memory or the ability of recognition,
interacting in well-mixed populations. The result might shed light on the role played by resource
constraints on the origin of multicellularity.
PACS numbers: 02.50.-r,87.10.-e,87.23.-n,89.75.Fb
Cooperation is common in nature in all levels of biolog-
ical organization [1], and it is considered to have played a
key role in the evolutionary appearance of higher selective
units, such as eukaryotic cells or multicellular life, from
simpler components [2]. However, its widespread abun-
dance is intriguing because cooperators are vulnerable to
exploitation by defectors [3], as detected early on [4, 5].
Since then, several mechanisms have been found allowing
cooperative behaviors to survive such as network struc-
ture, group selection, direct and indirect reciprocity or
tag-based donation [6, 7]. Behavioral mechanisms –the
latter three are examples of such mechanisms– require
players to have some ability to avoid the exploitation
from defectors, such as memory or the capacity to recog-
nise the co-player [6, 7]. As a result, simple agents with-
out these abilities, such as unconditional cooperators, are
not expected to survive in well-mixed populations.
Aside from a few examples [8–11], the role played by
the limitation of resources in most evolutionary game the-
oretical studies on the origin and persistence of coopera-
tion has been just to impose a constant population size
[6, 7, 12–17]. Recently, however, we have put forward a
new viewpoint where the interacting players are set into
a nonequilibrium context [18–20]. The environment is
considered explicitly by introducing a resource flux into
the system that drives it away from equilibrium. This
standpoint leads to unexpected outcomes, such as that
resource limitation allows for stable coexistence between
unconditional cooperators and defectors, and even dom-
inance of cooperation, in well-mixed populations playing
an a priori Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. This hap-
pens due to a self-organizing process involving the envi-
ronment which generates dynamical payoffs transforming
the original PD structure into a neutral game.
One of the main results of the analysis performed in
ref.[19, 20] is that a well-mixed population of uncon-
ditional cooperators extinguishes for infinite resources
(where the system plays a PD game) but may survive for
some parameter values when resources are finite (where
the game is not a PD anymore). This suggests the possi-
bility of a transition from a population of only defectors
when resources are abundant to a population containing
cooperators for more stringent environments. The exis-
tence of this transition should have great interest, since
it would provide a resource-based mechanism preventing
the spread of defectors and thus may shed light on the
conditions under which cooperators could survive during
the evolutionary process. Indeed, the survival of cooper-
ative strains has been recently observed experimentally
in yeast (S.Cerevisiae) [21–23] and bacterial (E.Coli)
[24, 25] cultures, and has also been found in a model
for the survival of aerobic cells inside anaerobic cultures
[26, 27]. The models depicted in refs.[19, 20], however, do
not yield such a transition: in these models we considered
that the population was ruled by a resource limiting re-
production, and that deaths occurred at a constant rate,
so that the limiting resource influx determined the pop-
ulation size; as it was thoroughly discussed, a reduction
in the resource flux just decreased the size of the popu-
lation in the same proportion, but it did not modify its
composition.
Our aim here is to devise a scenario where the selection
pressure drived by resource limitation combined with the
nonlinearities induced by this resource limitation in the
interactions among players may lead to a transition of
the type discussed above. In this scenario, we assume a
limiting resource that constraints reproduction in a pop-
ulation of constant size due, for instance to space con-
straints. The plaussibility of the latter assumption is dis-
cussed at the end of the paper. The model developed here
is a stylized one inspired in the model of ref. [20], which
consists of an evolving population of self-replicating indi-
viduals that receive resources from the environment and
exchange resources during interactions. In order to avoid
the effect of spatial structure and focus on the effect of re-
source constraints, we consider a well-mixed population.
No memory, learning abilities or any other sensory in-
puts are assumed. Each individual i is represented by its
amount of resources, Ei, which in this simplified model
is either 0 or 1, and its strategy, namely cooperate (C) or
2defect (D). Its amount of resources may be interpreted as
the amount that belongs to it independently of how (it
may be in its surroundings, for instance). Each defector
attacks at a rate α per unit time to individuals chosen
at random and steals its internal resources. To do so,
the defector must have internal resources greater than
0 (i.e. Ei = 1), otherwise it does not attack. In every
interaction, the defector loses its unit of resources with
probability q, which can thus be seen as the average cost
paid by a defector in an interaction. If the interaction
partner has no resources, no reward is obtained. Coop-
erators do nothing, they just eventually suffer from de-
fectors’ attacks. We assume that behaviors are inherited
without mutation and represent physiologic or morpho-
logic characteristics intrinsic to individuals which cannot
be modified by choice.
Each individual receives from the environment γ units
of resources per unit time independently of its strat-
egy, thus not modifying the interaction payoff structure.
When an individual with internal resources Ei = 1 re-
ceives an extra unit of resources it splits into two identical
copies, each one with Ei = 1. Along with reproduction,
we assume that players die with a probability f , indepen-
dently of its strategy, in such a way that the number of
individuals in the population remains constant. There-
fore, resource allocation, reproduction and death rules
are equal for both cooperators and defectors, being the
strategy the only difference.
Let us note that, in this model, an increase in the envi-
ronmental resource supply is represented by an increase
in γ, the amount of per capita resources obtained by in-
dividuals. This contrasts with the model in refs. [19, 20],
where an increase of resources leads to a proportional in-
crease in the population size while keeping the same per
capita value.
We consider simultaneous interactions and large pop-
ulations so that we can make a continuum approach. We
denote by c0 and c1 the fraction of cooperators with in-
ternal resources 0 and 1, and d1 and d0 = 1− c0− c1−d1
the fraction of defectors with internal resources 1 and 0,
respectively. The equations governing the evolution of
cooperators are the following
dc0
dt
= αc1d1 − γc0 − fc0 (1)
dc1
dt
= −αc1d1 + γ(c0 + c1)− fc1 (2)
The αc1d1 term shows the fraction of cooperators C1 that
lose their internal resource unit after the attack of defec-
tors (the latter pertaining to the population d1); these
individuals move from population c1 to c0. The term in
γc0 quantifies the fraction of individuals C0 that change
to population c1 after getting a unit of resources from
the environment. In addition, individuals in population
c1 that receive resources from the environment replicate,
thus increasing the c1 population. The terms fci describe
the fraction of individuals dying in each population per
unit time.
To describe the evolution of defectors is enough to
write the equation for population d1 because d0 is just
the remaining fraction of the whole population. The dy-
namic equation for d1 is
dd1
dt
= −αqd1 + αc1d1 + γ(d0 + d1)− fd1. (3)
The terms related to deaths and resource allocation from
the environment are analogous as for cooperators. The
interaction term is as follows. On the one hand, with
probability q individuals D1 lose its resource unit when
interacting with individuals C0, D0 and D1; this leads
to a decrease in the population of d1 in an amount
αqd1(c0 + d0 + d1). On the other hand, when interacting
with individuals C1, individuals D1 sequester their re-
source unit; therefore, either the population of D1 does
not change, with probability q, or it increases due to re-
production at a rate αc1d1(1 − q).
To complete the equations of the model, we need an
expression for the death rate f . In order to have a con-
stant population size, the frequency of deaths must equal
the frequency of reproductions. This leads to
f = γ(c1 + d1) + α(1 − q)(c1 + d1)d1. (4)
The first term denotes reproductions due to resource al-
location and the second one to reproduction of D1 in-
dividuals when attacking individuals with Ei = 1 and
not paying the cost. Eqs. (1)–(4) are the equations of
our model. They can be further simplified by noticing
that one can divide all the equations by parameter γ
and absorb it into the time parameter; therefore, there
are just two dimensionless parameters in the model, q
and β = α/γ. A large β value indicates either large de-
fector attack rates or small resource influxes from the
environment; conversely, large resource influxes or small
attacking rates yield small β values. The dimensionless
equations are the same Eqs (1)–(4) replacing α by β, and
γ by 1.
The numerical resolution of the model shows that the
system is attracted to a globally stable fixed point in-
dependent of initial conditions. Depending on the pa-
rameter values, the final fate is either a population of
defectors (an expected solution) or, interestingly, a sta-
ble mixture of cooperators and defectors. Remarkably
enough, for fixed q, small β values, i.e. large resource in-
fluxes, provide a population of just defectors, but when
β exceeds a critical value βc a mixed state appears, thus
providing a smooth phase transition from defective states
to mixed states as resources become scarce (see Fig. 1a).
The existence of stable mixed states in the model may
be explained in terms of the overexploitation mechanism
discussed in ref. [19]: an excess of defectors may reduce
cooperators’ resource contents and, as a result, the av-
erage reward obtained by defectors; eventually, rewards
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FIG. 1: (a) Phase transition for q=0.5. The fraction of coop-
erators c0, c1 and defectors d1 (see text) above the threshold
are denoted with solid, dashed and dotted lines, respectively.
Below the critical value βc = 7.58 cooperators die out. (b)
Defectors’ benefit versus costs in coexistence states. It equals
the frequency rate function f(q) (see text). The dashed line
E′
r
= q is a guide to the eye.
decrease below costs and cooperators recover. Interest-
ingly, we can obtain simple analytical expressions for the
composition of the mixed state as a function of parameter
β above the threshold:
ci = ai(1−
βc
β
), d1 =
a2
β
, (5)
with ai and βc functions of parameter q.
Remarkably, the dynamics in coexistence states selfor-
ganizes defectors’ rewards to be (almost) equal to costs
thus turning the payoff matrix to neutral. According to
the model, the payoff matrix for an average interaction
is
( C D
C 0 −E′
r
D E′
r
− Ec −Ec
)
(6)
with E′
r
the average reward obtained when a defector at-
tacks a cooperator, and Ec = q the average cost paid
when a defector attacks. Then, the average reward re-
ceived by defectors when interacting with cooperators is
E′
r
= c1/(c0 + c1). Eq. (5) shows that E
′
r
= a1/(a0 + a1)
and then it is a function dependent only on q, and not
on β. Fig. 1b displays the reward E′
r
as obtained nu-
merically versus the cost q showing that E′
r
≃ q. They
are not exactly equal because, as explained in Eq. (4) of
ref. [19], they may differ when death frequencies f are
not small compared with resource intake. In this model,
f cannot be arbitrarily chosen because of the constant
population condition. Indeed, Eqs. 1–2 readily show that
f = c1/(c0+c1) = E
′
r
and then Fig. 1b also displays f(q).
One observes that f is generally of order 1 (this is the
cause of the small deviations found in Fig. 1b). At small
q, however, f is also small and E′
r
and q match perfectly.
One can further study the transition by drawing a
phase diagram β − q with the regions where each be-
havior dominates. It is possible to obtain an analytical
expression for the critical curve βc(q) by performing a
stability analysis. To do so, let us recall that for a fixed
point to be stable in three dimensions the trace and de-
terminant of the Jacobian matrix must be negative. Our
model system (1)–(4) has at least two fixed points, cor-
responding to pure populations of cooperators and de-
fectors: (A) c1 = 1 (the remaining variables equal to 0),
and (B) c0 = c1 = 0 and d1 6= 0 obeying, according to
Eq. 3,
d1(f + βq) = 1. (7)
As we know, it may also have a mixed fixed point, given
by Eq. 5, but it need not be considered for our present
purpose. Linear stability of fixed point A leads to the
jacobian matrix


−2 0 β
1 −1 −1− 2β + βq
−1 −1 β(1 − q)− 1

 , (8)
with determinant D = 4β(1 − q) > 0. The positive sign
shows that at least one of its three eigenvalues is positive.
Then point A is always unstable for q < 1 and coopera-
tors never occupy the whole population. Fixed point B
provides the following jacobian matrix


−1− f∗ βd
∗
1
0
1 1− βd∗
1
− f∗ 0
−1 −1− d∗
1
df
dc1
+ βd∗
1
−βq − f∗ − d
∗
1
df
dd1


,
(9)
where d∗
1
and f∗ are the values of these quantities in fixed
point B. To be compact, let us call J33 = −(βq + f∗ +
d∗
1
(1 + 2β(1 − q)d∗
1
)) < 0. The trace is T = J33 − 2f∗ −
βd∗
1
< 0, and the determinant can be written as
D = J33(−1 + βd
∗
1
f∗ + f
2
∗
). (10)
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FIG. 2: Phase diagram. The solid line indicates the numerical
solution, the dashed line the analytical approximation βc =
q−3. Cooperation is favoured at large β, i.e. small resource
fluxes or large attacking rates (see text).
Then, for point B to be stable the term inside parenthe-
sis has to be positive. Although this is not a sufficient
condition to prove that point B is stable, the numerical
resolution of Eqs. (1)–(4) shows that this is the case; this
is the region where defectors are dominant. When the
parenthesis in Eq. (10) is negative point B becomes un-
stable, wich means that a small fraction of cooperators
will grow and survive (notice that point B is the only
fixed point with only defectors). Then, since point A is
also unstable, in this situation there must exist a third
(mixed) fixed point in the dynamics. Eq. (5) supplies
the solution for this mixed fixed point and numerical so-
lutions show it is a stable attractor, the one describing
the stationary coexistence of cooperators and defectors
found at large β values. In order to obtain the cuve βc(q)
separating the regions of dominance of defectors from the
mixture of cooperators and defectors we should find d∗
1
from Eqs. (4) and (7) and solve the equation
− 1 + βcd
∗
1
f∗ + f
2
∗
= 0. (11)
The exact analytical solution of this transition curve is
very cumbersome, so that we try two alternative routes.
One is to obtain a numerical solution (see Fig.2), the
other one is to find an approximate analytical solution.
In this sense, let us note that, if β2q3 ≫ 1 Eqs. (4) and
(7) show that d∗
1
≃ (βq)−1, because βq ≫ f∗ ≃ (βq
2)−1.
In this limit, the instability condition (11) just gives
βc = q
−3, (12)
which provides an excellent approximation not only for
β2
c
q3 ≃ q−3 ≫ 1 (say q <∼ 0.5 ) but over the whole range
0 ≤ q ≤ 1 as shown when compared with the exact nu-
merical solution (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2 shows that cooperation is favored at large costs
q and large β, whereas defectors dominate in the opposite
limit. The origin of the dependence on the average cost
q is rather direct: the larger the cost, the less favorable
for defectors to reproduce. The dependence on param-
eter β is, however, counterintuitive since (at first sight)
one would expect that large attack rates (large β) should
benefit defectors. The explanation is not easy due to the
nonlinearities involved in the model. One might think
that the origin of the observed behavior relies on the ex-
ploitation mechanism that explains the existence itself
of coexistence states, and accordingly reason that large
attacking rates would cause a great damage on coopera-
tors, which would reduce rewards over costs, ultimately
harming defectors. However, this is not what happens,
since we have seen above that the average reward E′
r
is
a function of q only, and then it does not change when
increasing β at fixed q.
One explanation of why large β favor cooperators is
that it leads to a small fraction of defectors in the active
state (D1), thus reducing the damage on cooperators. In
effect, if resources are abundant individuals receive them
frequently and there will be large populations of D1 indi-
viduals; if resources are scarce, only a few individuals will
be in state Ei = 1. The same occurs if attacking rates are
large. Since attacks are indiscriminate, defectors are also
victim of the attacks, which decrease the number of D1
individuals; conversely for small attacking rates. This ex-
planation is consistent with the behavior of d1 displayed
in Fig. 1a. Indeed d1 decreases yet from β = 0, i.e. below
the transition, as it can be seen from our approximate so-
lution d∗
1
≃ (βq)−1. Below some critical population value
depending on q (around q2) the reduced population of de-
fectors in the active state is not capable of extinguishing
cooperators. In this point is worthwhile to point out that
parasites continuously receive resources from the environ-
ment and interact, and then, they change from active to
inactive states continuosly. In the stationary state, the
fraction of defectors in the population is d0 + d1. These
defectors spend a fraction of time d0/(d0+d1) in inactive
states and d1/(d0 + d1) in active states.
In summary, we have developed a simple model de-
scribing a phase transition from defective parasitic pop-
ulations (which dissipate some amount of resources in
order to gain a higher reproduction rate) when resources
are abundant to the survival of cooperators when re-
sources are scarce. This is the result of a self-organizing
process involving subtle nonlinearities in the interactions
induced by resource constraints. In contrast to previous
models, where the same limiting resource ruled repro-
duction and population size [19, 20] and do not display
this transition, the model studied here assumes that the
factor limiting reproduction is different from the one lim-
iting the population size, so that populazion size remains
approximately constant. This may be accomplished in
chemostat or retentostat experiments [28–31], which may
allow for laboratory testing of the predictions of the
model. Indeed, recent experiments with S.Cerevisiae [21]
5and E.Coli [24] at low concentration of glucose agree with
the results presented here of the survival of cooperative
traits instead of their expected extinction in unstructured
populations.
In natural environments, the constant population as-
sumption may apply in situations where space constraints
the size of the population more restrictively than re-
source scarcity. Of course, a complete description of spa-
tially distributed populations goes beyond the mean-field
model presented here, and should consider that interac-
tions occur only among neighbors. Note however, that
space alone is well-known to favor cooperation because
it permits the formation of clusters of cooperators. Since
we have seen here that resource limitation alone already
allows for the survival of cooperation, the combined ef-
fects of both space and resource limitations are expected
to enhance the conditions under which cooperators can
prevent their extinction. Other extensions of the model,
beside the inclusion of space, may be the introduction
of continuous behaviors (and not just two, namely coop-
erate or defect), what could shed light on the observed
phenotypic radiation of behaviors in E.Coli [25], which
represents an exception to the competitive exclusion prin-
ciple [33].
In a broader scope, the results presented here might
have played a role in the route towards the emergence
of multicellularity by cooperative aggregation triggered
by resource constraints. It has been argued [22, 26, 27]
that such transition happened whenever cooperative indi-
viduals formed clusters, which subsequently evolved nu-
trient exchange between the components of the cluster,
and later evolved a joint replication mechanism, stage
at which a higher-order organism can be considered to
exist. However, such studies do not explain why coop-
erative bacteria survived in a first stage before forming
clusters. The mechanism presented here provides some
insights for the maintainance of such cooperative indivi-
dals before clusters of cooperators could form, being a
first step towards the formation of multicellular organ-
isms.
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